

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 4403

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: ANNUAL U.S. POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR SOVIET UNION

REF: A) MOSCOW 1047 B) MOSCOW 1958 C) MOSCOW 1117

1. U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION REFLECT THE FACTS THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS A WORLDWIDE AS WELL AS A BILATERAL CHARACTER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS OUR MAJOR GLOBAL ADVERSARY, AND THAT IN SOME LIMITED AREAS OUR INTERESTS COINCIDE. WE SEE U.S. OBJECTIVES TOWARD THE USSR IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF PRIORITY:

A. TO AVOID WAR;

B. TO MODERATE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR:

C. TO KEEP SOVIET INFLUENCE FROM GROWING RELATIVE TO OURS IN AREAS OF IMPORTANCE TO US;

D. TO DEVELOP A GREATER SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN FINDING SOLUTIONS TO SUCH GLOBAL PROBLEMS AS FOOD, POPULATION, RESOURCE AVAILABILITY, AND ENVIRONMENT;

E. TO EXPAND ECONOMIC/TRADE COOPERATION IN A MANNER

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CONSISTENT WITH U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN ORDER TO INCREASE

THE SOVIET STAKE IN GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS, DEMONSTRATE U.S. INTEREST IN SUCH RELATIONS, AND SERVE U.S. COMMERCIAL OBJECTIVES;

F. TO ESTABLISH PATTERNS OF LONG-TERM BILATERAL COOPERATION AND CONTACT IN THE ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND OTHER FIELDS; AND

G. TO ENCOURAGE A GREATER OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE SOVIET REGIME IN THE INTEREST OF BASIC HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND OF MAKING THE SOVIET UNION A MORE NORMAL MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THEREFORE A MORE ACCEPTABLE DETENTE PARTNER FOR AMERICANS.

2. PROGRESS TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES DURING THE PAST YEAR, THOUGH MIXED, PROBABLY ADDS UP TO A NET PLUS FOR U.S. INTERESTS. IN THE STRATEGIC CATEGORY (OBJECTIVE A) THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING MARKED A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD. IN THE GLOBAL-POLITICAL CATEGORY (OBJECTIVES B, C, AND D), MOSCOW REFRAINED FROM OVERT EXPLOITATION OF SOME VULNERABLE AREAS (E.G., THE WEST'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, THE MIDDLE EAST, CYPRUS). ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIET INFLUENCE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED IN PORTUGAL AND WAS ENHANCED IN GREECE AND ETHIOPIA. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN HELPFUL IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CYPRUS, OR INDOCHINA, AND THEIR INTEREST IN COOPERATING ON GLOBAL PROBLEMS NOT OFFERING THEM AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PAY-OFF (FOOD, FOR EXAMPLE) REMAINS RUDIMENTARY. IN THE CATEGORY OF BILATERAL COOPERATION ESTABLISHED BY THE SUMMIT AGREEMENTS (OBJECTIVES E AND F) OUR HOPES FOR A QUANTUM INCREASE IN THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP HAVE SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK, ALTHOUGH A MUTUAL INTEREST HAS PERSISTED IN DOING WHAT IS POSSIBLE ECONOMICALLY AND IN DEEPENING OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY THE SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL/ EDUCATIONAL. FINALLY, IN THE HUMANITARIAN CATEGORY (OBJECTIVE G) THE SHARP DROP IN EMIGRATION, AT LEAST PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THE DISPUTE REGARDING THE TRADE ACT, IS A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT NO GREAT ADVANCES IN THIS AREA CAN BE EXPECTED. TO SUM UP, DURING THE PAST YEAR THE U.S. WAS MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL IN ITS OVERALL GOAL OF HELPING TO KEEP THE SOVIETS TO THE DETENTE COURSE SET AT THE 24TH PARTY

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CONGRESS IN 1971 AND AT THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT IN 1972. BUT THERE ARE CURRENTLY LARGE CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON IN PORTUGAL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. THUS, DURING THE COMING YEAR IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE SOVIETS TO A COURSE COMPATIBLE WITH THE U.S. VIEW OF DETENTE, OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE EFFORT REQUIRES OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY.

3. IN ASSESSING U.S. POLICY, IT REMAINS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND SOVIET OBJECTIVES TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE WEST IN GENERAL. WE VISUALIZE THESE IN THE FOLLOWING ROUGH PRIORITY:

A. TO AVOID WAR AND ULTIMATELY TO REDUCE ARMS EXPENDITURES; BUT, AT THE SAME TIME TO ENSURE THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IS SECOND TO NONE.

B. TO DEVELOP THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND LIVING STANDARD THROUGH WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY, AND EVENTUALLY ALSO THROUGH THE DIVERSION OF RESOURCES FROM THE MILITARY SECTOR;

C. TO NEUTRALIZE THE NATO THREAT, IN THE INTEREST OF ENHANCING SOVIET SECURITY AND OF FREEING MORE RESOURCES FOR DEALING WITH CHINA;

D. TO INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE WORLDWIDE AND TO ACHIEVE WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS A WORLD POWER WITH A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE, ON THE BASIS OF FULL EQUALITY WITH THE U.S., IN DECISION-MAKING ON ALL QUESTIONS OF MORE THAN REGIONAL INTEREST; AND

E. TO PREVENT ANY INCREASE IN AND, IF POSSIBLE, CURTAIL U.S. INFLUENCE IN AREAS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

4. THE SOVIETS HAVE CHOSEN A POLICY OF DETENTE IN AN EFFORT TO FURTHER ALL OF THESE OBJECTIVES EXCEPT THE LAST (TO WHICH DETENTE IS EITHER IRRELEVANT OR EVEN ANTIPATHETIC). AS WE POINTED OUT IN MOSCOW 1047, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS LOOK ON THEIR DETENTE POLICY DURING THE PAST YEAR AS A SUCCESSFUL ONE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT HAS SERVED THE OBJECTIVES NOTED ABOVE BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE BASIC SOVIET INTERESTS OF CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN POPULATION,
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HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE, AND PREDOMINANCE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. THE SOVIETS SHOULD VIEW THE COMING YEAR AS EVEN MORE PROMISING WITH A GRAND FINALE TO CSCE, A SALT 11 AGREEMENT, AND A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE ALL IN PROSPECT, NOT TO MENTION THE GROWING CONTRAST IN THEIR FAVOR IN POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH AS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THUS, WE ANTICIPATE THAT SOVIET POLICY-MAKERS WILL HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN CONVINCING THEMSELVES AND THEIR VARIOUS DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES THAT DETENTE REMAINS IN THE SOVIET INTEREST. THE DANGER FOR THE U.S. DURING THE COMING YEAR IS NOT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL RENOUNCE DETENTE BUT THAT IT MAY PAY LESS ATTENTION TO ASPECTS OF DETENTE WHICH INTEREST US.

5. THREE FACTORS--ALL OF THEM NEW WITHIN THE PAST YEAR--

MAKE SUCH A NEGATIVE OUTCOME POSSIBLE. THE FIRST IS THE POOR U.S. PERFORMANCE IN IMPROVING THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, WHICH AS NOTED IS ONE OF THE USSR'S MAJOR DETENTE DESIDERATA. THE SECOND FACTOR IS THE COMBINATION OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES BECKONING MOSCOW FOR GLOBAL EXPLOITATION. SOVIET DETENTE POLICY WAS ORIGINALLY PREMISED LARGELY ON THE THEORY THAT "IF YOU CAN'T BEAT THEM, JOIN THEM"-- THAT IS, ON THE ASSUMPTION OF AN AFFLUENT, STABLE, AND UNIFIED CAPITALIST WORLD. THAT ASSUMPTION IS NOW OPEN TO REVIEW, WITH AN ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE WEST, A SET OF POLITICAL SCANDALS WHICH HAVE COST THREE MAJOR LEADERS THEIR CAREERS, AND A SHARP SWING LEFTWARDS IN PORTUGAL AND GREECE (AND A SHAKINESS IN TURKEY) IMPLYING BALEFUL CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO. MOREOVER, U.S. DIPLOMATIC MAGIC APPEARS TO HAVE RUN OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND U.S. POLICY IN INDOCHINA SEEMS ON THE VERGE OF A MAJOR SETBACK. THE THIRD FACTOR IS AN INTERNAL ONE. AS WE NOTED IN MOSCOW 1958, BREZHNEV'S POOR HEALTH AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRE-CONGRESS SUCCESSION QUESTION COULD LEAD TO REDUCED SOVIET ENERGY IN PURSUIT OF THE POLICY WITH WHICH BREZHNEV HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.

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6. WHATEVER HAPPENS ELSEWHERE, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGIC CATEGORY OF THE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IS SEPARABLE FROM THE OTHER ASPECTS AND WILL BE PURSUED ENERGETICALLY BY THE SOVIET UNION, AS IT WAS EVEN DURING PERIODS OF THE COLD WAR. THIS DOES NOT MEAN

THAT SALT WILL NOT AFFECT PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS; A SALT
11 SUCCESS WOULD FACILITATE SUCH PROGRESS AND A FAILURE
WOULD HINDER IT. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM--THE
CATEGORY OF BILATERAL COOPERATION DELINEATED BY THE FIRST
THREE SUMMITS--THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE WILLING
TO PRESERVE AN ONGOING RELATIONSHIP LARGELY UNAFFECTED BY
POLITICAL WINDS. WITH REGARD TO THE ECONOMIC COMPONENT--
OF GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THEM THAN THE CULTURAL OR EVEN THE
SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL AGREEMENTS-- THEY WOULD PROBABLY
BE WILLING TO TAKE WHATEVER THEY COULD GET. PROVIDED THERE
WERE NO POLITICAL STRINGS ATTACHED.

7. IT IS IN THE GLOBAL-POLITICAL CATEGORY THAT THERE IS
THE GREATEST RISK OF A SOVIET POLICY ADOPTING APPROACHES
HOSTILE TO U.S. OBJECTIVES--IN PARTICULAR, TO OUR OBJECTIVE
OF USING DETENTE TO MODERATE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.
GIVEN THEIR COMMITMENT TO "PROGRESSIVE" MOVEMENTS AND
THEIR CONTINUING PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AND NATO AS ADVER-
SARIES, THE SOVIETS IN THE BEST OF TIMES COULD NOT BE
EXPECTED TO PLUCK AMERICAN IRONS OUT OF THE FIRE. MOREOVER,
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WITH THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP STYMIED, WITH THE
INCREASING SOVIET AFFLUENCE IN HARD CURRENCY AND ENERGY,
AND WITH A WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC OPTION WHICH SEEMS
TO BE GROWING MORE VIALBE FOR MOSCOW, THE U.S. HAS MUCH LESS
LEVERAGE THAN IT ONCE HAD TO INDUCE SOVIET MODERATION IN
TROUBLE SPOTS AND AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY.

8. THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT THE SOVIETS MAY COME TO
BELIEVE THAT SUCH OBJECTIVES AS NEUTRALIZING NATO AND
INCREASING THEIR GLOBAL INFLUENCE CAN BE ACHIEVED OUTSIDE
A DETENTE FRAMEWORK, THROUGH REVERSION TO A PATTERN OF
MORE MEDDLESOME INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. IF SO, THEY WOULD
BE LIKELY TO MOVE, INTER ALIA, TOWARD MORE ACTIVE EXPLOITA-
TION OF U.S. DIFFERENCES WITH ITS ALLIES (E.G., OVER U.S.
SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND U.S. COMMITMENTS IN INDOCHINA),
TOWARD MORE OBSTRUCTIONIST POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
CYPRUS, TOWARD MORE MEDDLING IN PORTUGAL AND GREECE, AND
TOWARD MORE OVERT SUPPORT OF THE DRV IN INDOCHINA. NEEDLESS
TO SAY, EVEN THE BEGINNINGS OF SUCH A PROCESS COULD CONTRIBUTE
TO A DOWNWARD SPIRAL IN WHICH IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFI-
CULT TO SUMMON A U.S. CONSENSUS ON CLOSER BILATERAL
ECONOMIC TIES, TO INFLUENCE SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY, AND
PERHAPS EVEN TO GET A SALT AGREEMENT RATIFIED.

9. WE REMAIN CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
MAINTAINS A DEEP INTEREST IN CONSOLIDATING WITH THE U.S. A
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY COMPATIBLE
WITH AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MAJOR DIF-

FERENCES IN HOW BOTH SIDES DEFINE THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

10. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PURSUE THE FOLLOWING OVERALL POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR THIS YEAR:

A. WE SHOULD ASSIGN OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A SUCCESSFUL SALT 11 AGREEMENT, SINCE THIS MEETS THE PRIMARY POLICY OBJECTIVE OF EACH COUNTRY AND WILL AFFECT THE BILATERAL ATMOSPHERE ACROSS THE BOARD.

B. WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO TAKE SOME ACTION THIS YEAR--EVEN IF LIMITED-- TO EXPAND THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. THE
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GRANTING OF MFN, EVEN WITHOUT CREDITS, WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DETENTE. EVEN IF THE ODDS ARE LONG AGAINST, WE THINK THE EFFORT IS WORTH IT. MEANWHILE, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO ALL IT CAN WITHIN PRESENT RESTRICTIONS TO ENCOURAGE INCREASED ECONOMIC CONTACT.

C. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR STRONG VIEW THAT EFFORTS TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD ARE INCONSISTENT WITH DETENTE AND THAT THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY TRUE ANYWHERE ALONG THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO, ESPECIALLY IN PORTUGAL. MOSCOW MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT CANNOT EXPLOIT U.S. OR NATO DIFFICULTIES WITHOUT RISK TO THE OBJECTIVES IT SEEKS FROM DETENTE, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN WE SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD A CSCE THIRD STAGE SUMMIT.

D. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SHOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS MORE OF THE PERQUISITES--AND TRY TO EXACT FROM THEM MORE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES--OF A GREAT POWER. OUR ROLE IN SUCH MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS LAW OF THE SEA IS ALREADY POSITIVE IN THIS RESPECT. NOW THAT THEY ARE IN ANY CASE BACK IN THE MIDDLE EAST PLAY, WE SHOULD MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY AND EXPLORE WAYS TO UTILIZE THEIR INFLUENCE, INCLUDING POSSIBLE GUARANTEE ARRANGEMENTS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THEIR RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEWER GLOBAL ISSUES. AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THAT, AS A GREAT POWER, THEY MUST EXPECT THE WAY THEY TREAT THEIR OWN CITIZENS TO BE SUBJECTED TO SCRUTINY FROM ABROAD.

E. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS, THROUGH NEW AND ESTABLISHED CHANNELS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATIONAL FIELDS--FOR A STRENGTHENING, A BETTER COORDINATION, AND AN EXPANSION OF THE NETWORK OF INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMUNICATION THAT HAS

RESULTED SINCE THE 1972 SUMMIT.

11. IT SHOULD BE SELF-EVIDENT THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION,
THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN THE WORLD TO US, THE U.S.
EMBASSY SHOULD HAVE READILY AVAILABLE ALL THE RESOURCES
THAT IT NEEDS TO DO ITS JOB. WITH THE QUANTUM JUMP

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SINCE 1972 IN THE DEGREE OF CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION
WITH SOVIETS THAT IS NOW POSSIBLE--AND IN MANY CASES
NECESSARY-- THE EMBASSY REMAINS WOEFULLY LACKING IN BOTH
ACCOMMODATIONS AND PERSONNEL. OUR CURRENT CHANCERY IS
INADEQUATE, AS HAS BEEN ATTESTED TO BY HUNDREDS OF
VISITORS AND SEVERAL TEAMS OF INSPECTORS; AND WE DO
NOT HAVE ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO MEET THE NEW DEMANDS ON
US. WE SPELL OUT OUR MINIMAL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL FISCAL YEARS IN A SEPARATE CABLE.
SUFFICE IT TO SAY HERE THAT THE COST OF WHAT EMBASSY
MOSCOW NEEDS TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY AMOUNTS TO LESS
THAN ONE-HUNDRETH OF ONE PERCENT OF WHAT THE U.S.
SPENDS ANNUALLY ON ITS OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.
WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A FUNDING ARRANGEMENT BY
WHICH EMBASSY MOSCOW'S ADMINISTRATIVE, MANAGERIAL, AND
PROGRAM NEEDS ARE GIVEN THE PRIORITY THAT THE U.S.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WARRANTS.

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